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ĀModern Chinese Conservatism”: A meaningful concept 
When writing on modern Chinese conservatism one of the first challenges is to reflect upon what it means to do 
that. Can we take Chinese conservatism as our theme just like that? Aren’t we imposing a Western concept that only 
makes sense as part of the triad of Liberalism, Marxism and Conservatism in the context of 18th to 20th century 
Western intellectual and political history? 
Asking these questions is not an exercise in academic political correctness, but a necessary prerequisite for 
approaching the historical phenomenon of whathitherto especially in China but also in the West has been called 
modern Chinese conservatism. There are obvious reasons why using the concept of conservatism is at least worth a 
try. The term conservatismor what common dictionaries take for that, i.e. ֱᅜЏН or ᅜ៤ЏН-is being widely 
used in China. Hence, to engage with what this term means in China is not a futile exercise. Yet, to write about 
Chinese conservatism is not the same as to explorein the tradition of German Begriffsgeschichtewhat the meaning 
of the Chinese terms ֱᅜЏН or ᅜ៤ЏН is. iIt goes without saying that the analysis of what these Chinese terms 
mean has to be part of the application of the concept of conservatism to China. It is rather the attempt to apply a 
generic concept developed in research on Western history to a nonWestern historical phenomenonvery much as if 
a Chinese historian would apply the concept of kaozheng (㗗䆕) to understanding and classifying the Rankean 
emphasis on archival work for historical research. Why should that make any sense at all? 
There are two reasons why it not only can make some sense, but why we basically have to apply this concept 
andin the process of doing thatadapt it to the case under scrutiny. The most obvious reason is the simple historical 
fact that there are Chinese intellectuals such as Liang Ch’ich’ao or Wu Mi and others who have engaged with 
Western conservatism and allegedly have been influenced by it. They haveas their Western counterpartsopposed 
an intellectual current that has identified itself and has been described as the Chinese enlightenment. If we assume 
that the Chinese enlightenment bears any similarity with core characteristics of the Western enlightenment and if we 
assume that conservatism is basically an antiEnlightenment movement as analyzed by Isaiah Berlin,ii then the 
cautious and balanced application of the Western concept of conservatism that is open to the possible failure of this 
endeavor is not only justified, but is in fact crucial. 
However, considering the possibility of an influence of Western conservatism be it in a direct way via Western 
conservatives or be it via the similarity of the opposed enemybegs the question what that influenceiii of the West on 
modern Chinese history and especially of Western ideas on modern Chinese intellectual history could be; a question 
that has troubled historians for nearly a century. From the Āchallengeresponseā iv and “history and value”v
models to the Āinner logic of Chinese historyāvi. and to Ādiscovering history in Chinaāvii various suggestions 
have been made. However, this question of how to do research on modern Chinese history, of how to evaluate 
Western influence on it, of what perspective to adopt is a question that can be quite misguiding. 
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For one reason, because the answers brought forward more often than not suggest either the dominance of the 
“Western influence” or the “continuity of China’s tradition”. Not only that I would not know what “China’s 
tradition” refers to, the juxtaposition as such is misleading. Not so much because it suggests a ĀWestā and a 
ĀChinese traditionāthese hermetically closed concepts have been criticized and abandoned long ago, but 
because it insinuates a general model of Āinfluenceā that can be clearly identified and that is equally applicable 
across various fields of human interests, knowledge and activity. To me it seems to be much more plausible to 
assume that the patterns of encounter, reception, adaptation, rejection etc. not only vary over time, space, and type of 
activity, but also depending on personal, social, and political background of the protagonists involved. 
There is, however, a more important reason why the debates on the models of influence and cultural interaction 
have to be taken with caution. This reason is the underlying assumption that we, the observers, the researchers, can 
actually in a kind of disinterested, dislocated way freely choose among them. I am not arguing that we can not 
make informed choices between competing interpretations of an historical event or of a system of ideas, however, 
we all are situated within, thrown into specific historical and cultural locations that form and guide our 
perspectives.viii Rather thansay as a German sinologist trying to look at things Chinese from the inner perspective 
doing as if one could discard one’s cultural baggage, or as a present Taiwanese historian writing about these topics 
as if they would not come from and have implications for the here and now, why not turn the situation on its head 
and emphasize the 2005 German, Taiwanese or whatever perspective and thus disclose a way of looking at the 
world rather than hiding behind a seemingly objective or neutral posture? We still can try to take a glimpse from the 
inner perspectiveby, e.g. analyzing the concepts Chinese researchers use to make sense of their history and culture, 
yet we will always have to admit that this is at best an ideal goal and at worst a farreaching selfdeception. To 
research the phenomena that hitherto have been described as modern Chinese conservatism with the help of 
concepts of conservatism that are of Western origins is thus not only justified as argued above, it is in fact 
unavoidable and the success or failure of this endeavor depends on whether or not this is being done in a careful and 
balanced way. It is against the background of these methodological considerations that my ongoing research project 
on modern Chinese “conservatism” has to be read. 
Towards a conceptual framework 
What then is conservatism? Should we use this concept at all and if yes, how should we use it? Asking these 
questions we immediately face the thorny issue of how to deal with a plethora of more or less pejorative terms used 
to describe and/or attack people who speak in one way or the other in favor of traditional socio-political practices: 
reaction, conservatism, traditionalism, nativism, cultural nationalism etc. We can observe at least three ways of 
using the term Āconservatismā:
(a) “Conservative” is to identify this person as the target for attack; 
(b) as a descriptive term referring to positions that have been labeled by others (continuously over a longer period) as “conservative”, and 
(c) as an analytical term clearly defined in its own right. 
On top of that, in studies of modern Chinese history the term is often used to refer to people 
(a) who can neither be classified as “liberal” nor as “Marxist”, 
(b) who argue in one way or the other in favor of continuity with China’s tradition (however that’s defined in each respective case),ix or 
(c) who advocate a concept of change that emphasizes gradual change.x
 The term conservatism in its daily usage is thus either polemical or descriptive and in any case only vaguely 
defined. Its application to China is further complicated by its Western background and identification with very 
concrete substantial claims of “conservatives” that very often only make sense in the context of British, German, 
French, US-American etc. history and tradition and its particular configurations. Any meaningful general concept of 
conservatism has thus to abstract from the concrete social, political and historical circumstances and focus on types 
of thinking. Only then will we be able to use it fruitfully in a cross-cultural comparison of modern intellectual 
phenomena that will also help us to discern basic philosophical and cultural differences.xi
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Most generally speaking conservatism as a phenomenon of modern intellectual history is a specific philosophical 
and politicalxii position with regard to the question of the origins and substance of ultimate standards of human 
behavior, the nature of human beings and human society, and, last but not least, the nature of historical change 
(“history” in the modern sense) and its role in undermining any sort of absolute and eternal standards. xiii
Conservatism clearly is a modern phenomenon, because it arose in the wake of the enlightenment challenge against 
the authority of tradition, i.e. against inherited, religiously or cosmologically grounded views on these matters, and 
thus had to organize and rationalize a defense against (some of) these challenges. Contrary to Mannheim, who 
juxtaposed one type of conservative thoughtxiv with the Enlightenment or natural law type of thought, I argue that 
we should distinguish at least two types of conservatism both of which arose in opposition to the Enlightenment:xv
the classicist and a historicistxvi  conservatism.xvii  Both are opposed to key tenets of the Enlightenmentxviii such as 
the emphasis 
a. on timeless, universal reason and the deduction of particulars from universal principles, 
b. on the natural sciences as the model for all sciences (mechanistic world view), 
c. on the general applicability of laws to history and society and hence the control of history and society, and particularly in the West- 
d. on popular sovereignty, human rights and equality.xix
 Classicist conservatives do not object to the Enlightenment’s emphasis on universal standards, however, they 
oppose the specific standards the Enlightenment proposes, i.e. the assumption that all human beings are equally 
rational and that human beings can-based on reason and with the help of modern science-understand and thus 
ultimately control the world. Classicist conservatives argue that there exists a set of timeless and universal moral 
standards that although it can be apprehended, can not be altered and adjusted to human needs or desires. On the 
contrary, the human condition is defined by these standards.xx
Time and again, classicists point out-in the West mostly referring to Greek philosophy-that the essence of these 
moral standards is to exert self-control, to restrain oneÿs desires rather than to pursue pleasure in a hedonistic or 
utilitarian way, is to value duty rather than to cherish rights, and is to act in such a way as to further the interests of 
the collective and not of the individual. However, these aims can not be enforced or ensured via some grand socio-
political design-as those inspired by the Enlightenment thought they could. The utmost human beings can do, is to 
set up socio-political structures that are to a certain extent conducive to the realization of these standards. However, 
due to the limitations of the human mind and the inherent fallibility of human beings this is facing serious 
limitations and will time and again fail. The classicist conservatives thus share with the Enlightenment the emphasis 
on timeless, ahistorical principles that can be used to understand history, but which are not affected by the course of 
history itself. 
The historicist conservatives, in stark contrast to that, start out from the assumption that all human institutions are 
historically relative. They argue that universal standards such as those proclaimed by their classicist contemporaries 
or the Enlightenment philosophes may perhaps exist, however, due to the limits of human understanding and human 
moral faculties, they can not be apprehended and are hence ultimately irrelevant. Rather than trying to apprehend the 
Āun-apprehendableā, historicist conservatives argue that human beings have no choice but to rely on particular, 
historically grown traditions. They should inherit, continue and further develop tradition, i.e. the wisdom of the 
forefathers, and should not be blinded by the crooked fantasies of arrogant philosophes and their notion of timeless 
human reason that supposedly can control and improve the environment and human society. Opposing the 
Enlightenment, historicist conservatives hold historically grown, relative culture, language, and customs in high 
esteem. They contrast arcane and vigorous life, which can not be anticipated, with what they perceive as the empty, 
arid theories of the philosophes. For them being-the individual, contingent existence of the here and now-is the 
starting point from which to strive for knowledge and wisdom that converges towards the universal. Therefore they 
attack what they call the static way of thinking of the Enlightenment, which imagines the correct way of thinking as 
an “ought” independent of the historically grown “is”.xxi
Eventually this type of conservatism, sharing with the romantic movement its passion for the individual and 
irrational, leads to a thorough historicization of all aspects of human life and thus makes an important contribution 
to the development of modern historical science and to the development of the philosophy of life of the late 19th
century and later to existentialism. Quite different from romanticism, however, the historicist conservatives attempt 
to anchor the individual being in larger entities: tradition and society. Tradition is the historically grown, tested 
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wisdom of the forefathers on which one has to rely in order to cultivate a good society.xxii Society is seen as an 
organism that is not structured in a mechanical way as the sum of its parts, but as a totality that takes on qualities 
distinct from its individual elements, which thus only become understandable as parts of that totality.xxiii
What both types of conservatism share is their stress on human fallibility, their doubts with regard to universal 
human reason, and their rejection of any notion of a necessary, linear historical progress. Besides, both types of 
conservatism assume in their political anthropology that considerable variation exists among human beings and that 
they thus either differ in their capacity to understand the classicist moral standards or in their capacity to live 
according to the inherited historical traditions as historicist conservatives request. They hence articulate a qualitative 
vision of freedom, rather than the quantitative, egalitarian view typical for the Enlightenment protagonists.xxiv
It is obvious that the boundary between conservatism on the one hand and cultural or romantic nationalism on 
the other hand is sometimes hard to draw.xxv There are, however, some decisive difference to be found in the attitude 
towards the nation-state as a modernizing agent that establishes a modern educational system, transforms subjects 
into citizens, sets up a modern military and a modern infrastructure, and creates a modern economic system with an 
efficient tax system as its core. Nationalists of whatever sort emphasize the egalitarian, national community of 
compatriots. This community might be defined with reference to history and culture, which seems to be similar to 
historicist conservatism. However, the goal of all these efforts-to build a nation-state, a community of citizens 
compatriots, and a new collective national identity-is to modernize. Conservatives doubt this goal, because it either 
contradicts the universal ethical standards of the classicist conservatives or because it is not in line with the 
historicist conservatives’ attempts to carefully inherit and build on the wisdom of tradition. In other words: 
conservatives who turn to the state as the focus of collective identification and then accept or even support this state 
in pursuing a policy of political, social and economic modernization are no longer conservatives. 
In late-developing countries, which are under enormous pressure from modernized countries, xxvithe distinction 
between conservatism and nationalism is even more delicate. Because of the need to secure naked survival, it 
became necessary to pursue a policy of industrial-technical modernization. This in turn soon led to changes that 
went far beyond a purely Āindustrial-technicalā level. So, even committed conservatives in these countries were 
before long facing the choice of either sticking to their principles and thus facing the possibility of extinction or of 
making compromises and eventually having to give up core elements of their conservative ideology. As a result of 
this pressure, various forms of blending compromises occur that further complicate the distinction between 
conservatism and cultural or romantic nationalism, a phenomenon we can widely observe in modern Chinese 
intellectual history.xxvii
Research on modern Chinese conservatism 
Western research on modern Chinese is-in comparison to research on Chinese liberalism, Marxism and other 
“non-conservative” intellectuals scarce. An indirect approach that has been quite influential for a long time is 
Levenson’s model of history and value, which-with regard to conservatives and traditionalists (the distinction is in 
fact not made in Levenson’s work)-posits that tradition can no longer rationally be defended; hence those who are 
nevertheless defending it do that out of an emotional attachment to history only.xxviii This model has been criticized 
for reducing the commitment to tradition to something not rationally justifiable and hence purely emotional, and for 
thus missing an important aspect of the thought of those considered to be conservative, because it can not really take 
them serious. No wonder that in Levenson’s work the conservatives are mentioned only in passing.xxix
Another approach is to interpret modern Chinese conservatism as an exercise in intellectual camouflage for 
authoritarian rule.xxx Meißner analyses the thought of Chang Chün-mai and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and their role in the 
debate on science and metaphysics and comes to the conclusion that this debate was mainly a continuation of the 
age-old conflict between speculative Sung Neo-Confucianism and empirical Han-learning, a continuation which led 
to the reception of only those elements of Western thought that could be adapted and integrated into Chinese forms, 
in which process they were misinterpreted. Neo-Confucianism is-according to Meißner -a system of thought 
characterized by the assumption of an a priori Li (⧚), that denies diversity, assumes the existence of one unifying 
metaphysical principle as the basis for the polity, and can thus easily be used for authoritarian political ends. As is 
the case today in the PRC, this conservative way of reasoning only allows for a partial, that is, economic, 
modernization and is mainly apologetic.  
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This interpretation too ignores the possibility of sincere, rational commitment to traditional values, albeit with 
different implications. It is highly improbable that Chang Chün-mai’sxxxi and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s arguments were 
primarily of a political-apologetic nature. The later political career of Chang provides ample evidence for the fact 
that the simple equation of conservatism with authoritarianism is mistaken. Besides, leading cultural conservatives 
of the 1920s and 30s, such as Chang Shih-chao and Chang Ping-lin, were in favor of a federalist political system and 
opposed to a centralist, authoritarian state. 
A less narrow approach can be found in the only Western monographxxxii on Chinese conservatism in the 20th
century by Guy Alitto. He sets out from the hypothesis that Chinese conservatism is characterized by the same 
attributes as everywhere else, the most important of which is a dualistic structure of thinking. Conservatives contrast 
ideas which they consider to be typically Western with a corresponding autochthonous Chinese idea such as e.g. 
matter and spirit or reason and intuition. Alitto traces the postulated global uniformity of conservatism back to a 
likewise uniform process of modernization, which the conservatives oppose. The main difference between the 
countries where modernization originated and late-comers is the fact that in the latter the modernization process was 
conceived of as being foreign and forced upon them. Therefore, culturally conservative and nationalist motives 
came to be blended, resulting in a latent contradiction between particularistic and universalistic points of view. 
Nationalist motives resulted in the extensive acceptance of foreign thought with the aim of strengthening the nation 
in the fight against imperialism, whereas culturally conservative motives emphasized the protection of the particular 
tradition in order to preserve cultural identity.xxxiii
Although Alitto’s analysis of this contradiction and of the dualistic structures of conservative thinking does take 
into account some characteristics of Chinese conservatism, his theory is marred by its rigidity. In the Chinese case it 
is obvious that not all intellectuals of the Republican period that are considered to be conservative conceived of their 
culture as being particular and, therefore, did not embrace a dualistic world view xxxiv . Furthermore, this 
interpretation fails to consider the political and social motives and implications of the various conservative positions.  
In contrast to these studies, the articles published in Charlotte Furth’s The Limits of Change emphasize the 
heterogeneity of Chinese conservatism and pay attention to the intellectual convictions as well as to the political 
aims and implications of the conservative positions discussed. Furthermore, they tend to interpret the cultural 
continuities and discontinuities as the result of a long and complex process of reception of Western ideas and their 
interaction with autochthonous Chinese conceptions.xxxv
According to these articles two different types of crises can be discerned: a crisis of identity expressed in the 
dichotomy of particularism and universalism; and a crisis of meaning that is related to what Charlotte Furth 
identifies as the separation of culture and politicsxxxvi and what Chang Hao addresses as a fundamental spiritual 
disorientation triggered by the demise of the old Confucian moral cosmology.xxxvii  These two crises are by no means 
characteristic to conservatism, however, conservatives adopt specific strategies to deal with them. According to 
Charlotte Furth the separation of politics and culture is a way for cultural conservatives of the National Essence 
School to become politically progressive while trying to safeguard traditional Chinese culture or at least parts of it. 
Culturexxxviii-previously central to the emperor’s legitimacy now looses its cosmic quality and becomes a realm in its 
own interest and a focus of a new type of historically minded research. She argues that there were basically two 
types of modern Chinese conservatives: those as the National Essence School or the later nativists who emphasize 
China’s national, particular culture that no longer serves any direct political, legitimizing purpose, and the neo-
traditionalist Confucians who emphasize that Confucianism is the core of China’s culture and is de facto of 
universal relevance. This second type emerges only after the May Fourth movement and strives to reintegrate 
culture and politics. During the 1920s and 30s it is philosophers such as Liang Shu-ming and Feng Yu-lan who 
represent this universalistic orientation, whereas particularistic nativism, stressing and sometimes idealizing China’s 
national culture, is exemplified by advocates of National Essence and by the Kuo-min-tang of the 1930s.xxxix The 
Hsüeh-heng group, established in 1922, around Liu Po-ming, Mei Kuang-ti, Wu Mi, and Liu I-cheng, seems to 
occupy a middle ground between these two types. 
This approach is very useful, because it situates the conservatives in a tension between two different yet 
connected crises that can be applied to modern Chinese intellectual history of the late 19th, early 20th century in 
general. It also aims at identifying different types of conservatives such as the National Essence School and the 
nativists, or the neo-traditional Confucians. However, especially with regard to the former the definition remains 
rather ambiguous and makes it difficult to differentiate between conservatives and cultural nationalists who are still 
pursuing the goal of quite far-reaching modernization. The reliance on China’s now nationalized culture, the 
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reference to its particular traditions and history can serve quite different purposes depending on the arguments 
brought forward to justify that and the context within which these arguments are made. In other words: to invariably 
interpret emphasis on national and/or cultural particularity as an attempt to address the crisis of identity and an 
expression of a separation of culture and politics as Charlotte Furth has phrased it, with culture here best understood 
as referring to the traditional moral cosmology of Heaven, is not convincing. This emphasis and the disintegration of 
the old cosmological and political vision did affect many modern Chinese intellectuals across all ideological camps. 
Emphasis on national particularity can be found among revolutionary nationalists and a separation of culture and 
politics can be found among liberals. Both reactions are-as I will argue and try to substantiate on the following pages 
by relying on my above mentioned definition of conservatism not typically conservative. 
Bearing in mind how I have defined conservatism and the state of the field as described above it is crucial to 
reassess allegedly conservative intellectuals and positions. What we have to look at in order to come to a better 
understanding and a clearer typology of conservatism is the way intellectuals justify ultimate moral and political 
values and tenets, and how these are related to history, i.e. to change in time.xl As cases I have selected two 
intellectuals-Wu Mi and Ch’en Yin-ch’eh-from the Hsüeh-heng group and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, who is often 
characterized as having turned conservative after his trip to Europe after World War I. 
The Hsüeh-heng group: A general classificationxli
Founded in 1922 the Hsueh-heng became one of the most influential conservative journal of the 1920s and 30s. 
The Hsueh-heng itself can be roughly classified as consisting of three groups of intellectuals, who were united in 
their opposition to the New Culture Movement. 
The core group of syncretistic Neo-humanists consisted of Mei Kuang-ti, Wu Mi, Hu Hsien-su, and others, who 
focused on literature and literary criticism. Their basic arguments can be traced back to their student-days in the 
USA under the influence of Irving Babbitt, one of the leaders of American New Humanism.xlii Babbitt argued 
against the materialistic and utilitarian aspects of modernity and envisioned a universal humanistic civilization being 
a combination of the European classical tradition of Greek philosophy, Indian Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism. 
The scholars of this core group contended that the Chinese national essence can be found in the classical 
literature,xliii which has to be protected against modern materialism, romanticism and utilitarianism. But in contrast 
to many other conservatives of this period like Liang Shu-ming, they did not equate these Āismsā with the West, 
but rather emphasized the basic similarity of Chinese and Western classical civilization. Nowhere can we find a hint 
in their writings that they conceived of Confucianism as a Chinese remedy to the Western illness of modernity, but 
rather as one part of a classicist answer to the problems of modernity. 
They opposed the May Fourth Movement not because it advocated a new culture, but because of what they 
perceived as its romanticism and utilitarianism and, last but not least, its iconoclasm; in other words: the May Fourth 
Movement stood from their point of view for the wrong Ānew cultureā. They argued instead that the clear-cut 
juxtaposition of old and new, East and West is misleading,xliv traditional narrative and poetic forms.xlv
 The ideal culture was to be based on Confucianism and, simultaneously, to embody the principles of Neo-
humanism. Only those foreign elements were to be adopted, which are of universal value and are adequatexlvi to 
Chinese culture. The task of the scholar-poet is to represent this humanistic culture and to lead society. Although 
Wu Mi and his colleagues seldom addressed questions of China’s future political organization, it is obvious that they 
opposed modern mass democracy as well as a return to traditional political forms, i.e. the restoration of a monarchy. 
Instead they preferred a highly elitist form of state with the Confucian scholar-poet at the top of the social and 
political hierarchy.xlvii The second group within the Hsüeh-heng camp, which later became known as the school of 
historical geography,xlviii consisted of scholars like Liu I-cheng, Miao Feng-lin, Cheng Ho-sheng, Chang Ch’i-yün 
and others, who had not studied in the West.xlix Mostly professional historians this group stood for a China-centered 
universalism. Although they agreed with most of the neo-humanistic principles of their above-mentioned colleagues, 
they did not participate in the dissemination of Babbitt’s ideas in China. They rather concentrated on the refutation 
of May-Fourth historiographyl and defended the traditional, ethical view of history. Despite this rather traditional 
approach to history they tried to realize their aims by using new forms and methods of historiography and were 
actively engaged in the reception of Western theories of historiography.li
During the 1920s Liu I-cheng and Lu Mou-te published in the Hsüeh-heng in serialized form two of the first 
monographs on cultural history. Liu’s aim in writing his History of Chinese Culturelii was to analyze the exchange 
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between China and foreign people throughout history in order to discover the “causality”liii of cultural change. He 
reached the conclusion that although China had several times been heavily exposed to foreign cultures it had always 
succeeded in assimilating these influences. According to Liu this was due to the particularity of its culture and 
national spirit, which he saw as embodied in the Confucian rites. But, as becomes abundantly clear in his History of 
Chinese Culture as well as in other articles, Liu assumed that China with its superior Confucian ethics will again 
take the lead over Western civilization or at least make significant contributions to the badly shaken materialistic 
culture of post-war Europe.liv
A third type of intellectual loosely linked to the Hsüeh-heng group consisted of historians like Wang Kuo-wei, 
Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, T’ang Yung-t’ung and Chang Yin-lin, who were linked to the Hsüeh-heng rather loosely.lv They 
did publish a few articles in the Hsüeh-heng and although it is obvious that they shared some basic humanistic 
convictions of the Hsüeh-heng scholars, they never actively participated in the publication and editing process of the 
journal.lvi
Whereas Wu Mi stressed the universal neo-humanistic civilization consisting of Western, Chinese and Indian 
elements, Liu I-cheng from the group of historical geography emphasized the particularity of Chinese culture, 
sometimes even implying that it is superior to Western culture. Ch’en and T’ang chose an intermediate position that 
can best be described as stressing cultural particularity and assuming that all cultures are-in terms of world culture-
of equal standing, thus implying a universalistic perspective. 
This classification of the various groups with the Hsüeh-heng camp is nothing but a first step at analyzing their 
diverging conservative positions. Especially with regard to the first two groups many questions remain to be asked 
such as: 
a. What exactly was their ideal of a universal civilization and how did it relate to China’s traditions? 
b. Did they proceed from the assumption of the equality of different civilizations sharing some core values, or did they 
envision one unified civilization? 
c. What were their concepts of historical change and how were these related to the eternal standards of universal civilization?
d. What was the role of Chinese culture in universal civilization and how would it contribute to it or be incorporated into it?
In order to find answers to these questions I will in the following analyze Wu Mi’s vision of ethics, culture, and 
history. 
Genesis of the question 
Starting with research on the development of modern Chinese historiography and especially of the historiography 
and historical thinking of Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien, I ended up comparing their views with those of 
Leopold von Ranke, the famous German architect of “scientific history”, who allegedly was the model of both, 
Ch’en and Fu. The aim of this comparison was not so much to take one side in order to judge the other or to use the 
standards of modern Western historiography to evaluate how “advanced” modern Chinese historiography was at the 
time of Ch’en and Fu. The aim was rather to proceed from an admittedly modern Western perspective and see 
whether the application of some of the questions asked in the West about the typical modern, i.e. historical
condition to Chinese historiography would make any sense and if yes what sense it would make. True, this inquiry 
remains within the confines of a modern Western perspective (which is the only one I have), but if done carefully it 
will unravel important differences.  
On the following pages I quote from a previous publication summarizing my findingslvii on the historiography of 
Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, Fu Ssu-nien and Ranke. The aim is to clarify, first, my point of departure with regard to central 
notions such as “modernity”, “historicity” and the “crisis of modernity”, and, second, to look at Ch’en’s and Fu’s 
historiography from that perspective. 
The historiography of Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, Fu Ssu-nien and Ranke 
Key concepts: modernity, historicity 
By “modernity”lviii I refer to the ongoing process of historicization and, hence, relativization of norms and values 
once conceived as timeless and universal. In Europe this process has been characterized by a decline of 
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metaphysical and theological assumptions on the structure of the world and a concomitant decline of traditional 
assertions of ontological and epistemological coherence. The world was less and less conceived as one finite world, 
but rather turned into a meta-world, that was dissolved into a diversity of possible world viewslix -a term in itself 
symptomatic of the change that had taken place. 
Kant’s philosophy only was but a first step towards what Max Weber would later call “disenchantment”. In his 
epistemological turn Kant transferred the structures of the world into a priori structures of consciousness, thus 
preparing the ground for the ongoing process of decentering the world. However, history understood as the 
historicity and relativity of human existence not yet played any role-Kant’s world was still one world, even if turned 
epistemological.  
But not later than Hegel, history became the central issue and Western thought ever since has been characterized 
by various attempts at reconciling historical relativity with universal norms. However, Hegel’s view of history was 
not only based on the conviction that historical particulars had to be reconciled with a universal spirit, it also 
provided a teleological path of the articulation of the Spirit in world-history, thereby ultimately subordinating the 
individual to universal necessity. 
In the course of the decline of German idealism, his grand vision and the underlying premises of Enlightenment 
and Idealism were increasingly challenged. From Herder’s philosophy of individual cultures, to Ranke’s historicism, 
and to Dilthey’s view of history based on a philosophy of life. It was not until after World War One that these 
approaches were superseded, culminating in the growing awareness of an irreconcilable chasm between contingent 
facts and normative tenets. Heidegger, for example, refuted any attempt at defining a metaphysical absolute, 
declaring the historicity of human existence to be the only universal left.lx
None of these philosophers and historians reestablished a universal teleology of history. Universal reason, the 
backbone of Enlightenment, was explicitly denied a dominant role in history and became itself historicized. Most of 
the historicist and hermeneutic approaches in fact opposed and replaced the Enlightenment idea of progress by the 
notion of “development” (German Entwicklung). Based on an analogy with individual organic growth, the idea of 
development did not entail a hierarchy based on the progressive realization of knowable norms.lxi
In the light of these historical developments of reflecting on “historical development” I suggest to conceive of 
modernity as a phenomenon that can not be adequately characterized by a totalizing notion of the progress of reason 
or any other absolute.lxii Instead, I believe that it should be understood as marked by the intrinsic tension between 
attempts, on the one hand, at resurrecting some sort of philosophical, theological, historical, or scientific certainty, 
and, on the other hand, the consequences deriving from the verdict of Nietzsche, that God is dead and mankind is 
liberated from and condemned to live without firm metaphysical or theological foundation.lxiii
Turning to China, however, it is striking first, how much our image of modern Chinese intellectual history has 
long been dominated either by May Fourth historiography or by state-official ideologies, and that, second, Chinese 
intellectuals opposed to these interpretations have been stigmatized as conservative or even as reactionary.lxiv Yet, 
taking into consideration that in Europe it were the very conservatives contributing in important ways to the 
clarification of the notion of historicity and the problem of modernity,See Mannheim, Karl, Konservatismus, Ein 
Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens ˷Conservatism, A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge˹ (Frankfurt/ 
Main: Suhrkamp), 1984. paying more attention to their Chinese counterparts will help us to arrive at a more 
balanced understanding of the relation between historicity, national particularity and the problem of universals.  
Given the fact that historically the writing of history in China had always enjoyed a higher status than in the 
West,lxv it is no wonder that historiography found itself at the center of modern debates, not only leading to a 
considerable reorientation of Chinese identity, but also to a growing awareness of the challenge posed by modernity. 
Already from the late Ch’ing onwards Western ideas began to influence the conceptions and eventually the very 
language by which Chinese intellectuals tried to cope with that challengelxvi. Though historiography initially had 
been heavily influenced by the evolutionary world view, lxvii  already in the 1910s the situation had changed 
dramatically as various imported concepts of historiography together with indigenous traditions shaped a discourse 
that was very lively and pluralistic. 
Although both Chinese historians I discuss here have followed dissimilar methodologies and agendas of research, 
both have been described as having been influenced by Ranke.lxviii Therefore a comparison of their historiography 
will not only shed light on the processes of the adoption and appropriation of Western thought and its intermingling 
with indigenous approaches, but can additionally serve as an example of how Chinese historians tried to cope with 
the modern problem of historicity, the crisis of identity and the task to redefine China’s position in the world. 
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Ranke’s historiography 
Ranke usually comes to mind as the founder of empiricist research emphasizing the critical evaluation of archival 
material, and aiming at objective knowledge about the past. His often quoted slogan that the aim of research is to 
find out “wie es eigentlich gewesen” represents this image.lxix
However, his methodology was nothing but a means to a higher end. The historicist Ranke argued against the 
enlightenment approach to history, castigating it as superimposing abstract theories on history, thereby violating its 
very individuality. Not philosophy, but theology was the basis of his view of history. He assumed that every epoch 
is characterized by its “particular tendency” and its “own ideal”. The aim of writing history thus was to elucidate the 
differences between the individual epochs, and to show how every epoch, although individual and incomparable, 
was the manifestation of God’s will. The methodological conclusion was to envision historical research as a 
basically hermeneutic project. The prerequisite attitude towards the object of research was to be one of “Mitgefühl”, 
that is “compassion” or “empathetic understanding”. The historian was to become aware of the individuality and the 
ideals of an epoch through intuition and spiritual contemplation.lxx
But how can we make sense of these apparently self-contradictory demands to carry on disinterested, objective 
research and, at the same time, to contemplate the very individuality of history as the expression of divine 
providence? For Ranke, to be sure, this was not a contradiction. Understanding history as the always individual 
manifestation of God’s will, almost inevitably led him to the demand not to subdue a past to present, subjective 
needs of making sense of the past. On the contrary, meaning was to be found in the past and the only way to relate 
this meaning to one’s own present was through God. This understanding of the relation between historical 
particularity and the religious universal was his way of defending the particular, that is Germany, against what he 
perceived as the arrogance of universal enlightenment, that is the French revolution, without being forced into 
relativism.  
Yet, at the end of the nineteenth century, many German historians, already far removed from Ranke’s world view, 
had lost faith in divine providence. They either did-in a positivist manner-put more stress on the methodological 
aspects related to the treatment of primary sources or were looking for other ways of relating the historical to the 
universal as was the case with Dilthey’s philosophy of life.lxxi
The historiography of Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien 
Turning to the reasons why Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien have been labeled the “Chinese Ranke” it is most 
interesting to note that both argue for a very different philosophical and methodological approach to history.  
Fu,lxxii a leader of the May Fourth Movement, was mainly oriented towards scientific positivism. He advocated a 
view of history as determined by geographic-climatic factors comparable to laws in the sciences, a view he applies 
to explain how the Chinese nation came into being.lxxiii  Besides, Fu envisions history as characterized by the 
universal progress of mankind towards a rational, scientific mode of thought. He depicts Hsün-tzu and K’ao-cheng 
(㗗䆕) empiricism as precursors of scientific, rational thought, which thus loses its Western coloring and is being 
raised to universal status.lxxiv Referring to Rankelxxv and K’ao-cheng methodology he strongly argues against any 
kind of interpretation, and formulates the task of the historian as exclusively consisting of the verification and 
organization of the material, allowing the bare facts contained in the material to speak for themselves. Accordingly, 
he opposes the use of any kind of theory or view of history and fiercely condemns any involvement of the historian 
in politics.lxxvi
This short summary reveals that in his case China’s history as a particular history was muted by subordinating it 
to universal laws. Thus he tries to establish a Chinese identity by fitting China into world history as determined by 
characteristics that are universal, but in fact are of Western origin. While he ventures to find precedents of the 
correct, scientific world view in Chinese history, he forsakes the very possibility to device an answer to the question 
of what is typically Chinese.  
Although Fu referred to Ranke only once it is not unlikely that he equated his approach with that of Ranke, 
namely the empiricist Ranke. The problem of how to define and protect one’s particularity without being trapped in 
relativism and historicity could hardly be resolved within the limits of this approach. In fact, Fu’s approach of 
subjugating China to universal laws that to a certain extent allow the prediction of its future, can be interpreted as 
implying the dehistoricization of China’s past. At the same time, however, Fu satisfied his nationalist agenda 
enacting China as an equal member in the world of nation-states, and was, contradicting his own methodological 
stipulations, again and again driven into political nationalistic actionlxxvii, a fact that was not only reflected in his 
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many journalistic publicationslxxviii and some methodological texts,lxxix but also in some of his historiographical 
writings of the 1930s.lxxx
Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, in contrast to Fu, stressed cultural particularity assuming that all cultures are of equal status, 
thus implying a universalist perspective. His research was based on the assumption that Chinese history is 
characterized by the gradual development of its particular “national spirit” (min-tsu ching-shen, ⇥ᮣ㊒⼲). He 
identified the Confucian social ethics as its core (San kang wu ch’ang,ϝ㒆Ѩᐌ),lxxxi without hypostatizing it as an 
unchanging essence.lxxxii He focused on the ongoing exchange between China and foreign peoples, in order to show, 
that its national spirit has always been in the making by assimilating external influences.lxxxiii Ch’en claimed that 
only the receptivity to external stimulants had guaranteed the persistence of Chinese cultural identity by preserving 
its core, though in different historical manifestations. Any notion of an unchanging national essence contradicts this 
concept of continuity by change in the same way as the unqualified adoption of foreign ideas alien to the Chinese 
national spirit.lxxxiv
What guarded him against cultural relativism was the notion of “the universality of abstract ideals” (ch’ou-hsiang 
li-hsiang chih t’ung-hsing, ᢑ䈵⧚ᛇП䗮ᗻ). Referring to Plato he recovers the lost universal ground not by 
proclaiming a humanistic Chinese civilization superior to the West (as e.g. Chang Chün-mai) or by referring to 
universal science (as e.g. Fu Ssu-nien), but by assuming the formal universality of human attachment to “abstract 
ideals”, which do vary from culture to culture and change in the course of history, but have to be protected in order 
to safeguard the identity of the respective culture.lxxxv
Accordingly, the historian’s task is seen to consist in contributing to the recollection of the national spirit, an aim 
he has to achieve by adopting a historicist, hermeneutic methodology. His research should be based on the 
meticulous examination of historical sources, aiming at the “empathetic understanding” (t’ung-ch’ing chih liao-
chieh, ৠᚙПњ㾷) of the historical manifestations of the national spirit. Then, and only then, may the historian 
venture to evaluate history from a present perspectivelxxxvi. The correlate of this was the demand, that the historian 
should stay aloof from politics. Because history is no longer the manifestation of absolute principles the historian 
looses his former, eminently political position to actualize the universal Tao through historiography. Ch’en thus 
dissolves the previous unity of knowledge and action and assigns the historian the new role of a mere guardian of 
historical memory and cultural identity.lxxxvii
Ch’en’s view of history is thus a form of idealism, albeit qualified by his emphasis on the particular 
manifestations of abstract ideals. The specific contents of these ideals vary from culture to culture, manifesting 
themselves in different ways in history. Hence, the ideals and their corresponding culture can not be integrated into 
world history by general schemes of evolution or by means of universal norms as implied by Fu’s approachlxxxviii. It 
is Chinese history which speaks to Ch’en who thereby wants to establish an identity that can only be integrated into 
the larger world through respect for each culture’s commitment to its specific ideals. 
In Ch’en’s case it is much more difficult to assess Ranke’s influence. Though he never referred to Ranke later 
historians claimed to know of such an influence.lxxxix However, if we take into consideration that Ch’en had studied 
in Germany for many years it may well be justified to assume that he knew of Ranke and the tradition of German 
historicism.xc Ch’en’s position surely was closer to the hermeneutic Ranke who struggled with the problem of the 
relationship between the individual and the universal and who opposed any notion of teleological progress. But this 
should not mislead us to ignore some fundamental differences between Ch’en and Ranke. 
While Ranke had lived in a Christian world still comparatively at peace with its theological assumption of a 
divine providence and untroubled by the devastating experiences of the 20th century, Ch’en could not fall back on a 
Christian God for solace. At the same time he was-far more than Ranke confronted with far-reaching political, social, 
and cultural changes,xci bringing about the rapid decline of his Confucian world, a decline at least accelerated by a 
civilization more different from the Chinese world than France had ever been different from Germany. 
This may explain why Ch’en, comparable to European late historicism, tried to conceptualize a view of history 
capable of accommodating change without, however, necessarily leading to a breach of continuity and identity. He 
achieved this by means of a methodology that took historicity and culturality serious. It is true that he-as Ranke-
conceived of meaning as immanent in history, but at the same time he acknowledges that this meaning is mediated 
by the observer. Comparable to Dilthey’s historical methodology, Ch’en seems to conceptualize historical meaning 
as the product of a dialogue between manifestations of past human endeavors and present interested perspectives, 
integrated under the umbrella of overarching and coherent ethical and cultural orientationsxcii. Deprived of any 
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metaphysical foundation and opposed to a progressive universal Telos Ch’en embraced a view of history that left 
much more space for intercultural diversity and intracultural plurality.  
Two conclusions that can be drawn from this are important for the current context of reflecting on the question of 
the impact, influence of Western ideas on modern Chinese intellectual history.  
First, in the case of Ch’en and Fu we can find no evidence of a conscious and systematic reception of Ranke’s 
ideas. Fu referred to Ranke once; Ch’en never did. The influence might have been an indirect one or just a 
perception by their students and later researchers. However that might be, it becomes clear that the historical 
circumstances (much higher speed of change and the much more powerful threat China was facing) as well as the 
cultural and philosophical background (absence of any theistic notion of history-be it as “Heilsgeschichte” 
[redemptive history] or as pantheistic, yet in each case distinct, individual manifestation of God’s will in all epochs 
and across all cultures) were so different that a direct transposition of the “complete” Ranke-the evidential and the 
historicist, theological one-was not really an option. 
Second, a comparison of Fu and Ch’en has revealed that Ch’en-allegedly a conservative historian-developed 
much more explicit and conscious models of cultural interaction than Fu Ssu-nien. These models were based on the 
notion of historico-cultural particularity without, however, neglecting the question of universals and the relation 
between particularity and universality. 
These two conclusions directly led to two further questions: 
First, would the results be different in the case of a direct, explicit and conscious reception of Western thought? 
Second, can we observe similar strategies of dealing with the issues of particularity and universality, the question 
of cultural contact and exchange with other allegedly “conservative” intellectuals?  
In order to find answers to these questions I turned to Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s view of history and historiography and 
the influence of Neo-Kantianism on him. I analyzed it based on the assumption-that soon proved to be questionable-
that he was not without reason considered by his contemporaries and later researchers to have turned somehow 
conservative during the final years of his life. 
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Neo-Kantianism 
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s early theory of historiography 
In 1898, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao participated in a reform movement, which tried to legitimize change by going back to 
a redefined Confucianism that, although now acquiring a distinctive evolutionary touch, was still characterized by a 
moral cosmology. World-history was perceived as proceeding in three phases leading to an end of history where the 
world would be united in the future Great Harmony of moral perfection. 
In 1902, after the failure of the reforms, Liang abandoned these Confucian pretensions and adopted a worldview 
firmly rooted in a nationalistic and evolutionary concept of history. In his famous text “New Historiography” he was 
highly critical of traditional Chinese historiography, accusing it of narrowly focusing on the fate of the ruling 
dynasty and disregarding the interests of state and society. Traditional historians only described facts, lacked a 
commitment to “basic principles” (ॳ⧚), and neglected causality. They were therefore not able to understand the 
course of history, to anticipate the future and to provide political guidance. 
Influenced by New Text scholarship and by Western concepts of historiography Liang, firmly rooting the writing 
of history in a nationalistic and social-Darwinist worldview, defined as the task of historiography to arouse national 
consciousness among the population.xciii He propagated an evolutionary view of history based on the principle of 
causalityxciv. The task of the historian is to uncover the causal relations that underlie the universal evolution of 
humankind in order to understand the historical origins of the present and to anticipate the futurexcv. In line with this 
view of history, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao sketched a scheme of periodization for Chinese history (ϞϪ, ЁϪ, 䖥Ϫ) that 
closely resembles Western examples and implicitly places China on the same level as the West.xcvi
With regard to the important philosophical and methodological question of the relation between the “object” (ᅶ
ԧ) and the “subject” (Џԧ) of historiography, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao aimed at the combination of both. Without the 
object, i.e. the historical data under scrutiny, historiography cannot proceed, however, the subject, i.e. the 
“philosophical principles” (૆⧚) in the souls of historians and of the readers are equally importantxcvii. Liang 
remained ambivalent about the exact hierarchy of the object and the subject especially with regard to the question of 
whether the “philosophical principles” are applied by the subject consequently changing as the subject develops-or 
whether they are immanent in history and just have to be discovered by the subject through research. Given his 
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repeated emphasis on “evolution” (䖯࣪) and “causality” (಴ᵰ) it is justified to assume that he conceptualized the 
relation of object (history) and subject (philosophical principles) at that time as basically a necessaryxcviii relationship. 
Meaning and coherence are not applied to history from an external, contemporary position, but are immanent in 
history. The recognizing subject is thus able to position itself in an identifiable, coherent, and predictable movement 
of history explaining the present and leading to the future.xcix
Comparable to his teacher K’ang Yu-wei, Liang adhered to a view of history based on the belief in universal 
evolution. However, whereas K’ang knew the ultimate aim of this evolutionary process-the moral utopia of Ta-t’ung
(໻ৠ) firmly rooted in a reinterpreted Chinese past, Liang emphasized the universal principle of evolution at the 
expense of particular Chinese history and culture. Yet, in spite of this concept Liang was unable to solve the 
problems he faced. Admittedly, China had in theory become a nation among equals, but it lagged considerably 
behind. No wonder that before long Liang started to reconsider his view of history and culture. In the first issue of 
the journal National Customsc (೑亢), published in February 1910. He emphasized cultural particularities, their 
change over time, and their relevance for the nation’s identity and survival.ci
The development of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s historiography after 1919 
However, in the meantime, the next generation of young students impatiently sought to discard the moribund 
tradition and to modernize along Western lines. Around 1920 this New Culture Movement argued for the reception 
of Western democracy and science, and wholeheartedly adopted the naturalist worldview. 
Liang played a significant role in the reaction against the iconoclastic May Fourth movement that culminated in 
the debates on the cultures of the East and the Westcii and on science and metaphysicsciii. After returning from his 
journey to Europe, Liang started to reconsider his views of culture and history. From 1919 to 1923, he published a 
series of influential articlesciv increasingly doubting the evolutionary view of history he had propagated before. He 
now characterized Eastern civilization as spiritual and criticizes Western civilization as materialistic and hence 
inferior. As had become manifest during World War I the West emphasized science and mankind’s rational faculties 
too much and seriously neglected the moral side of human life. However, Liang did not go so far as absolutely to 
condemn science, which he still considered important for the project of China’s modernizationcv. He was thus able 
to reaffirm China’s superiority without being forced to retreat to an obscurantist rejection of everything Western.cvi
It goes without saying that the fundamental change in Liang’s view of the world considerably influenced his 
theory of historiography and culminated in his rejection of the social-Darwinist belief in evolutionary progress. His 
very influential treatise “Methods for the study of Chinese history”cvii (Ё೑ग़৆ⷨお⊩) published in autumn 1921 
is a first step towards this reconsideration. This text is based on a series of lectures Liang Ch’i-ch’ao gave at Nan-
k’ai University during which he obviously started to reconsider his view of history thus ending the sixth and last 
lecture contradicting the first one.  
The most prominent change concerns his increasing caution in assessing the role of causality in history. In the 
first chapter Liang basically reiterated his 1902 position that the aim of historical research is to uncover causal 
relations in history, to anticipate the future, and thus to be able to provide political guidance. However, already in 
this lecture Liang Ch’i-ch’ao did no longer mention the aim to discover “general precedents” (݀՟) in history, but 
defines the subject matter of historiography as human actions that are driven by emotions, reason and the human 
will. He thus implicitly acknowledged the role of subjective frameworks of meaning as one if not the moving force 
of history and seemed to move towards the negation of impersonal mechanisms of evolutioncviii. It is in the last 
chapter that Liang’s changed approach becomes fully explicit. He now defined the natural sciences as dealing with 
facts that are repetitive and completed, while history deals with singular and open-ended facts. Hence, the objects of 
the natural sciences are universal (᱂䘡) and transcend time and space, those of history are individual (Ͼᗻ),
created by mankind (Ҏ㉏᠔䗴), and particular in time and spacecix . However, he still was not prepared to 
completely discard laws of causality in history: 
It is strictly speaking probably impossible if not harmful to absolutely apply the law of causality to history. Why? Because 
history is created by human consciousness, which is extremely free and cannot be classified. Because the power of consciousness
is not completely subject to the law of causality of physics or mathematics, the history created by it has to be of the same 
character [as the power of consciousness]. To force the law [of causality] upon history is a dead end street. Therefore I call it 
impossible. Forcedly applying this law [to history] in spite of that would lead to the loss of the true face [of history]. Therefore, I 
call it harmful. May we [therefore] not talk of cause and effect at all? No, definitely not. Not to speak of cause and effect would 
amount to being unable to discover a system amidst the [mass of] countless, manifold, and changing historical traces. The 
7230  Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 
methods to create order would be exhausted. Not to speak of cause and effect would mean that we cannot take the past as a 
warning [example] and are unable to discern the future; the aim of historiography would be lost. Therefore we have to observe in
a penetrating way causal relations, however, the law of causality we use, must be different from that of the natural sciences.cx
Whereas in the first chapter Liang still had defined the subject-matter of history as comprehensive in terms of 
time and space and hence dealing with things continuous, he now explicitly denied continuity in history and traced 
this back to the human psyche as basically free and unpredictable. He asked to isolate “historical characters” (ग़৆
ⱘҎḐ㗙) that represent their time. In his New Historiography of 1902, national heroes still had served as an 
exemplification of the nationalistic struggle as part of the universal and coherent process of evolution. In contrast, 
the “historical characters” of 1921 are the manifestation of historical individuality. In order to discover these 
“historical characters” the historian now has to “analyze” (ߚᵤ) and to intuitively “understand” (Ⳉ㾝) historical 
facts in order to obtain a vision of the past’s “entirety and living [character]” (ᭈϾ㗠⌏)cxi.
Yet, the text ends leaving decisive questions unanswered. How does the historian come to an understanding of 
past individuality? Some reference to a hermeneutic methodology would have been necessary here to clarify Liang’s 
concepts. How does the recalling of past individuality lead to knowledge relevant for the present and the future? 
What is ultimately the role of causality in history? In other words: How does historical individuality allow for a 
vision of historical coherence that is necessary for the task of historiography to provide orientation and guidance for 
the present? It is obvious that in late 1921 Liang’s new views of history and theory of historiography were still 
developing. 
In December 1922 Liang further systematized his ideas in the text “What is culture”cxii  (ҔМᰃ᭛࣪), explicitly 
referring to the neo-Kantian philosophy of values as developed by Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Rickert. He defined 
the concept of “culture” by introducing the distinction between “individual achievements” (߿Ϯ) and “general 
achievements” (݅Ϯ ). The “general achievements” constitute the sphere of culture, a concept he further 
circumscribed as those things that do not exist by nature and necessity, but depend on human norms that are based 
on the freedom of human will. Hence, culture is not determined by causality, but is the result of free human creation 
and imitationcxiii. In “Several important questions of studying cultural history”cxiv (ⷨお᭛࣪৆ⱘ޴Ͼ䞡㽕䯂乬) of 
December 1922 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao applied this concept of culture to the study of history and reiterated his 1921 
definition of the subject matter of history as individual and particular in time and space. He again rejected causality, 
introduced instead the Buddhist inspired concept of “interdependence” (Ѧ㓬), and negated historical evolution, 
especially with regard to material progress that he described as highly dubious from a moral perspective. Yet, there 
still are two spheres where Liang assumed historical progress, i.e. the ideas of the equality and unity of mankind.cxv
Though we find here the first seeds of a new approach, it took him another five years before he moved beyond 
naturalism and discarded causality. But did he develop a concept that achieved both, to recognize historical 
individuality and establish cultural identity, while still allowing for historical coherence, or did he renounce 
coherence and certainty altogether? 
A final elaboration of Liang’s views of history can be found in his “Addition to the methods for the study of 
Chinese history”cxvi (Ё೑ग़৆ⷨお⊩㸹㓪) of 1926/27. Here he defined the purpose of history as giving “new 
meaning” (ᮄᛣН) and “new value” (ᮄӋؐ) to the “true facts of the past” (䖛এⱘⳳџᅲ) in order to provide a 
“lively mirror” (⌏ࡼⱘ䌘ⲥ) for the people of the present. Even though he used the term “new meaning” it 
becomes obvious in his discussion of this concept that “meaning” is not applied to history from a present perspective, 
but has actually to be found in history as meaning intended by historical protagonists, as meaning immanent in 
history but previously misunderstood, and as meaning never recognized but now rediscoveredcxvii. In other words: 
Liang developed elements of a methodology that clearly includes hermeneutic factors ultimately aiming at 
understanding historical individuality.  
Based on this methodology of understandingcxviii past frameworks of meaning Liang proceeded to the next step of 
“newly evaluating facts of the past” (ᡞ䖛এⱘџᅲ䞡ᮄⱘԄӋ). He further distinguished between temporary and 
eternal values: Events of “temporary value” (ϔᯊⱘӋؐ) are those, which were valuable for a certain period of 
time in the past, but nowadays have lost their value. Events of “eternal value” (∌ЙⱘӋؐ) are those the value of 
which was not obvious in the past, but became apparent later as e.g. the value of late Ming anti-Manchuism for the 
eternal nationalistic activities of the Chinese nationcxix. It is these eternal values that provide coherence to history 
and connect the past with the present. They form the basis of the historian’s quest to render service to society by 
anchoring the present in a meaningful past and relating it to an envisioned and desirable futurecxx. Yet even in this 
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context, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao warned against subduing the parts to the whole and repeatedly reminded the historian of 
his task to understand the motivations of individual historical actors, who, on the basis of their “free will” (㞾⬅ᛣ
ᖫ), are able to change the course of the whole. However, as if to make sure that he is not misunderstood as arguing 
for a conservative return to a Confucian view of history emphasizing the importance of morally upright sages or as 
supporting a relativistic “everybody his own historian”, he hastened to add that the historian should neither be 
blinded by traditional judgments handed down to the present, nor should he give in to his own prejudices.cxxi
From these statements, it becomes apparent that he oscillated between his respect for particular history and 
identity, and the wish to envision a normative and universal core of history illuminating the path into a desirable 
future. 
Neo-Kantianism, coherence, and historical individuality 
To judge Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s late historiography with the yardstick of neo-Kantianism would be a meaningless 
and intrinsically Eurocentric endeavor. However, to compare his approach with the neo-Kantian attempt to 
overcome the relativistic implications of historicism as well as the epistemological naturalism of the mainstream of 
19th century natural sciences is well justified. Not only that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao himself referred to Neo-Kantianism as 
one source of inspiration and kept using seemingly neo-Kantian vocabulary, he is on top of that, as I argue, facing 
the same dilemma as neo-Kantian thinkers in late 19th, early 20th century Europe: the dilemma of how to hold 
historical, and by implication cultural and national particularity and individuality in esteem, without becoming 
trapped in a paralyzing historical relativism that denies the coherence necessary in order to establish meaning, 
provide orientation, and allow for cross-cultural interaction. How to solve this dilemma after the demise of grand 
metaphysical and theological systems was the question that motivated the neo-Kantian philosophy of transcendental 
values. It was also the problem that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was struggling with after he had abandoned his previous 
nationalistic, evolutionary view of history-a view of history that always ran the risk of relegating China to an 
inferior and backward place within a universal temporal trajectory. 
The core of the neo-Kantian philosophy of values was the conviction that nature, that the physical world 
including history is chaotic and meaningless. Departing from this tenet Neo-Kantianism criticized both the 
positivistic natural sciences for their belief in the ontic status of general laws in nature and historicist philosophies 
for their belief in the immanence of meaning in history, meaning that accordingly has “just” to be discovered 
through the right methodology. Arguing against these metaphysical postures, Neo-Kantianism went back to Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy and transformed it into a philosophy of transcendental values. These values have no basis 
in reality, they are unreal. In other words: they do not exist, but they are valid-sie sind nicht, aber sie gelten.
Accordingly, Neo-Kantians rejected traditional ontology and wanted to replace it by an axiology of transcendental 
values. These transcendental values can be related in a purely theoretical way (theoretische Wertbeziehung) to the 
past, an operation through which meaning is attached to the historico-cultural reality that hence is transformed into a 
“carrier of structures of meaning” (Tr ger der Sinngebilde). This theoretical value-relation has to be clearly 
differentiated from the normative operation of “evaluation” (Wertung) based on one’s own convictions and hence 
serves as a bulwark against the perspectivism of a “everybody his own historian” type of historical theory as in 
pragmatism and the American New History approach. Simultaneously the theoretical value-relation rejects the 
relativism of historicism that finds always individual, ontic meaning in history thus defying historical coherence. 
However, the historico-cultural reality in itself remains meaningless and always individual unless it is actively 
related to transcendental values and hence invested with meaning.  
This transcendental approach also lead to a distinctive classification of the sciences. The difference between the 
“Naturwissenschaften” (natural sciences) and the “Kulturwissenschaften” (cultural sciences? Liberal arts?) is not 
based on the different ontic character of their respective subject-matters and the different research strategies they 
require (generalizing “Naturwissenschaften” versus individualizing “Geisteswissenschaften” as in Dilthey’s case), 
but on a different methodology of research (nomothetic “Naturwissenschaften” versus ideographic 
“Kulturwissenschaften”) that ultimately has a transcendental, i.e. unreal and not a factual foundation.cxxii
If we compare this approach to Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s late historiography, it is not difficult to discern that Liang’s 
concept was quite different. Liang was still looking for immanent meaning and tried to provide coherence through 
eternal values. Nowhere do we find terminological hints at a transcendental concept of values. Values are described 
as eternal and sometimes depicted as transcending time and space, i.e. as transcendent, but definitely not as 
transcendental. Meaning is immanent and has to be found in history. In short: Value and meaning still are real! 
Liang might have been inspired by Rickert’s terminologycxxiii, but the concept he developed is clearly very different 
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from Neo-Kantianism. This is also reflected in Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s distinction between the natural and the historico-
cultural sciences. His way of distinguishing them is as with Dilthey based on their different subject matters and 
hence ultimately based on the separation of different types of reality; it is an ontological and not a transcendental 
and axiological distinction.  
However, instead of leaping to the easy conclusion that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao simply misunderstood Neo-Kantianism, 
it is much more meaningful and challenging to relate these incompatible approaches to the different philosophical 
and historical environment. Whereas the Neo-Kantians argued against what they perceived as residual metaphysics 
in the positions of the historicists and the natural sciences, and hence developed a non-metaphysical, transcendental 
solution to the problem of coherence and individuality, the question Liang tried to solve was quite different.  
He argued against the deterministic evolutionary teleology of his own early nationalism and the seemingly 
immoral positivism of the natural science as propagated by the May Fourth iconoclasts. Both his enemies tended to 
neglect the particular in history as a possible basis for historico-cultural identity and ultimately subordinated China 
to universal concepts of Western origin as the basis for meaning and coherence. The issue of metaphysics and its 
decline in 19th century Europe was just not his problem.  
If we, in addition to that, consider the historical-political context, it will become even more plausible why he 
could not allow for a breakdown of certainty. China in the 1920s was on the verge of collapse. For somebody who 
devoted his life to saving China, this was definitely not the right time to contemplate meaninglessness. This 
difference in the context explains the difference in the theories of culture and historiography brought forward.  
However, it is evident that Liang nonetheless was struggling with the same problem as the Neo-Kantians. His last 
attempt to find an answer was still marred by severe inconsistencies. On the one hand, he stressed the immanence of 
meaning in particular history as an expression of human free will and a basis for Chinese identity. On the other hand, 
he searched for universal coherence that integrates China into world-history, provides orientation in the present, and 
leads towards the future. He tried to bridge the gap through the concept of eternal values identified as nationalism; a 
nationalism, however, that remained and probably had to remain amazingly vague in order not to uncover the 
dilemma [end quote Liang Ch’i-ch’ao]. 
Towards a conceptual framework 
This second example shows that even in a case of a direct reception the outcomes can be very different from the 
“original” and that it would be far too simple to attribute that to misunderstandings and/or a lack of knowledge and 
self-reflection. On top of that it clearly evinces that the classification of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao as “conservative” has to 
be revisited at least with regard to his commitment to “nationalism” -a political ideology implying actions such as 
state-building, enforcing a central, national educational system including the dissemination of modern political 
values such as democracy and citizenship-hardly the cornerstones of a “conservative” position. It remains to be 
explained, however, why with regard to his final years he nevertheless often is referred to as a “conservative”. By 
comparing his position with the “conservative” Ch’en Yin-ch’eh it becomes evident that it is their commitment to 
the historical and cultural particularity of China that they share. Yet, this position is also often identified in other 
contexts as “cultural nationalism”, a classification that further complicates the picture. It shows that although the 
coexistence of these two classifications can sometimes be attributed to an imprecise use of terms, it more likely is an 
indication of the fluid boundaries between the two concepts of (cultural) conservatism and (cultural) nationalism.  
It is thus three aspects that constitute a triangular horizon of inquiry for the following considerations. These three 
aspects are: 
(a) The complicated relationship between arguments in favor of particularity and historical continuity as an expression of a 
historicist view of tradition, history, and culture, and arguments in favor of historical and cultural particularity as an expression of 
a political or psychological concern for national identity,  
(b) The complex relationship between arguments in favor of tradition due to normative, universalist considerations, and 
arguments in favor of a particular tradition due to the predominantly political or psychological needs to soothe the crisis of 
identity, and, last but not least 
(c) The intricate role played by ideas coming from the West and their reception in China in this double crisis of identity and 
meaning.
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To rephrase this horizon of inquiry: it is the typically modern, tormenting question of the relationship between 
history understood as characterized by contingence and hence as particular (i.e. as historicity, see above) and ethics 
(philosophy) understood as a normative set of rules and principles of potentially universal and eternal status that-
together with the question of how this relationship developed in modern Chinese intellectual history on the 
background of China’s long traditions and under the influence of new Western ideas-forms the core of my research 
on modern Chinese “conservatism”cxxiv.
But why the so-called “conservatives”? Here again there are two reasons that are central for the clarification of 
the importance of modern Chinese “conservatism” for the inquiry into the questions outlined above: 
(a) Modern Chinese “conservatism” as a philosophical, cultural, and political phenomenon has itself not only developed in 
close contact with Western ideas, but also has, or, at least tries to establish deep roots in Chinese traditionscxxv. Quite opposite to 
what one would expect, it is the very “conservatives” who earlier and more profound than many of their liberal or Marxist 
colleagues at that time engaged with Western ideas in ways very illuminating for the questions raised above. 
(b) More important, however, is Modern Chinese “conservatism” as a conscious philosophical, cultural, and political debate
cxxviin which “conservatives” engaged directly and from very early on with the set of questions outlined above. We can find 
among “conservatives” implicit hints and elaborate explicit treatises concerning the questions of particularity, universality, 
cultural contact, reception of foreign ideas, the relationship between history and ethics, and the role of what can be called a
culture of historical reference in normative debates. 
However, before moving to the analysis of one group of “conservatives”, i.e. the Hsüeh-heng group, it becomes 
necessary to clarify how I define the concept of “conservatism”. I have hitherto been using this term only in 
quotation marks to indicate its purely descriptive character without considering its general analytical value or its 
usefulness in actual historical research.cxxvii
Wu Mi’s vision of ethics, culture and historycxxviii
The basis of Wu Mi’s view of culture, history and ethics is his metaphysics of the “one” (ϔ) and the “many” (໮)
that is of Platonic origins -in fact Wu Mi’s knowledge of Platonism goes back to his days as student under Irving 
Babbitt. It forms the core of an argument that at first glance looks similar to Ch’en Yin-ch’eh’s view of history, 
whose vision I would classify as predominantly historicist, albeit with some classicist undertones. In fact, however, 
Wu Mi’s metaphysical vision is part of a predominantly classicist-conservative argument. 
In the early texts published in the Critical Review this argument remains implicit and at times formalistic, 
however, a closer look at texts published from 1926 on in the Literary supplement of the Ta-kung-pao (໻݀᡹᭛ᄺ
ࡃߞ) and in the Critical Review (ᄺ㸵ᴖᖫ) shows that Wu Mi did concretize his ideas and developed a syncretistic, 
partly Confucian and partly neo-humanist (platonic) moral philosophy. 
It is striking that-at least as far as the terminology is concerned-Wu Mi’s metaphysics is heavily influenced by 
Western terms. He characterizes the realm of the “One” as absolute, eternal and universal, whereas the realm of the 
“Many” is described as relative, temporal, particular, and related to experience and illusion. He explicitly equates his 
juxtaposition with the platonic distinction between the realm of ideas and the realm of individual things, without, 
however, specifying that further. 
The differences between Wu Mi’s theory of the “One” and the “Many” and Plato’s theory of ideas, however, are 
apparent. Whereas in Plato’s philosophy the ability to apprehend the ideas is located in the immortal human soul 
that partakes in the realm of the divine, in Wu Mi’s case it is through (ethical) intuition that we become aware of the 
“One”. Wu Mi sometimes refers to the “soul”, however, he distances himself from the notion of its immortality. 
Besides, Wu Mi distinguishes between three cosmic realms: Heaven (໽), Man (Ҏ) and Matter (⠽). He 
identifies Heaven with the religious sphere, where the idea of the Good is located. Sometimes he equates this with 
God and refers to different religions. Out of this he seems to develop a notion of the equality of religions, which are 
all in their respective ways an expression of the One, the Good. In the realm of Man he locates ethics, and in the 
realm of Matter he locates the desires. This tripartite structure is  
similar and yet different from both, the Chinese traditional concept of Heaven, Man and Earth (໽Ҏഄ) and 
Plato’s theory of the three layers of the human soul, which consists of the Logistikon, i.e. reason, the Tymoeides, i.e. 
courage, and the Epitumetikon, i.e. desire. This tripartite structure of the human soul is laid out with the help of the 
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metaphor of the chariot, where the two horses are the Tymoeides and the Epitumetikon, and the charioteer the 
Logistikon. It is the task of the charioteer to guide and direct the two horses and to make sure that courage, 
Tymoeides, gains the upper hand over the desires, the Epitumetikon, and the chariot is thus being guided in the right 
direction. This threefold distinction finds its parallel in the threefold structure of the polis as disclosed in the Politeia.
It is the immortality of the soul that enables man to re-cognize the eternal, universal ideas and it is especially human 
reason (the Logistikon) that becomes aware of the Good, and not, as with Wu Mi, moral intuition. In other words: 
whereas with Plato the ideas and especially the idea of the Good can be apprehended by the soul, and here again 
especially by the rational faculty within the human soul, we find with Wu Mi a different concept: here it is Heaven 
where the Good is located, but it is in the second cosmic realm, the realm of Man where human beings through their 
moral intuition become aware of the One as the basis of all concrete ethical behavior and regulations. 
Another striking difference concerns the relationship between the One and the Many. In Plato’s philosophy the 
relationship between the ideas and the manifestations is unclear, however, a strong element of transcendence is 
obvious. In Wu Mi’s case the relationship seems to be as dualistic as with Plato, however we find no hint at a 
concept of transcendence. He speaks of the equal importance and “coexistence of the One and the Many” (ϔ໮ᑊᄬ)
and builds on that a vision of historical change and cultural plurality (see below). 
Moving on to the concrete ethics as formulated by Wu, it is striking to see that while he developed a metaphysics 
that is a mixture of Confucian and Platonic elements with strong Western terminological overtones, in the area of 
ethics traditional Neo-Confucian concepts dominate, at times related to Western notions such as duties and rights.
The key concepts are standard Neo-Confucian notions such as “humanness” (ҕ) identified as the “control of desires 
and the practice of rites” (ܟᏅ໡⼐), the Golden Mean (Ёᒌ), and of course the omnipresent “Three Bonds and 
Five Relationships” (ϝ㒆Ѩᐌ). What marks Wu Mi’s ethics out as distinctive during the 1920s and 1930s is not 
this standard view, but his claim that China can only be saved with the help of morality (“䘧ᖋᬥ೑”), i.e. only via 
its moral qualities will the nation be able to survive in the struggle against imperialist enemies. Whatever his notion 
of the role of ethics in the national struggle for survival, the substantial contents is again identified with and justified 
by reference to universal ethical standards exceeding national boundaries such as discipline, control of the desires, 
the awareness of human fallibility, and the obligation of the individual to a larger social collective (piety, duty). He 
links these standards up with and discusses them in the context of his treatises on Neo-Humanism and Irving Babbitt. 
Quite distinct from Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, T’ang Yung-t’ung, Liu I-cheng, Miao Feng-lin and other members of the 
Hsüeh-heng group, Wu Mi was not very interested in history and a theory of culture, i.e. his key interest was in 
literature and the role of literature in instilling the reader with ethical standards, and not so much in historical change, 
historicity and cultural differences. However, this does not mean that he did not care at all about this topics that 
occupied so many of his contemporaries.  
It is in the context of the tripartite horizon of inquiry that his metaphysics of the “One” and the “Many” acquire 
additional relevance, because Wu Mi uses this concept in order to clarify his ideas on history and cultural plurality. 
He identifies the “One” with “rituality” (⼐) and the “Many” with the plurality of particular “ceremonies” (Ҿ). The 
“ceremonies” can be and actually have to be changed and adapted to ever new circumstances, however, the 
“rituality” is fundamental, eternal, and should not be tampered with. Tampering with it would lead to a deracinating 
and dehumanizing critique of religion and ethics, exactly the kind of phenomenon Wu Mi identifies with the 
iconoclasm of the May Fourth movement. Any kind of change has to be anchored in and has to be a reflection of 
eternal ethical standards. Does this mean that the “Many”, the diverse manifestations are irrelevant? Definitely not: 
they form the basis of what is particular and Chinese, something Wu Mi clearly equates with Confucianism in its 
many manifestations. 
Preliminary findings 
From these first crude observations we can conclude that Wu Mi’s primary concern was not a crisis of identity, 
but rather a crisis of meaning with implications for political legitimacy and the question of social leadership. The 
issue of Chinese identity did concern him, but was clearly only of secondary importance. It also becomes evident 
that his reception of Neo-Humanism via Mathew Arnold, Paul Elmer Moore, and Irving Babbitt was systematic and 
yet strongly shaped by basic Confucian assumptions about the cosmos, man, and nature. However, it is also very 
likely that his Confucianism was equally influenced and partly transformed by his exposure to Neo-Humanism (ᕙ
㗗). A comparison with the view of history and cultural contact as expounded by Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh reveals that Wu 
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Mi is a classicist conservative who emphasizes the relevance of eternal, universal ethical standards for achieving a 
good life. Ch’en Yin-ch’eh in contrast seems to be much more interested in issues of national identity, admittedly 
still defined by reference to the Three Bonds and Five Relationships, but he never talks about their relevance for the 
rest of the world. The only hints that he might consider the Three Bonds and Five Relationships to be a particular 
expression of universal ethical standards can be found in his texts commemorating Wang Kuo-wei they remain 
rather ambiguous. 
What makes the Hsüeh-heng group such an interesting object of study is not only their intellectual position 
during the 1930s, but also the tremendous revival of interest in them during the 1990scxxix. Again we can find both 
motives back in the discussion: the crisis of identity and the crisis of meaning. Interestingly those in the debate who 
are responding more to the crisis of meaning, legitimacy and authority predominantly refer to Wu Mi, whereas those 
who claim more freedom for the intellectuals and academia heavily rely on Ch’en Yin-ch’eh. Both, however, share 
the concern for Chinese particularity: that China is different does not seem to be a bone of contention among them. 
What is contended is what makes China different and how it should relate to the world: on the basis of universal 
ethical values of basically Confucian background, or on the basis of a pluralistic notion of the equality of the 
unequal? 
What is equally important to note is that the nature of the debate of the 1930s as well as of the 1990s is one of a 
debate being conducted in a culture of historical reference, a tradition of inquiry that frames questions and looks for 
answers by consciously positioning oneself in a continuum of moral and historical inquiry-maybe there is still no 
real difference between the two. Tradition from this perspective is not so much this or that school of thinking or this 
and that interpretation of how things developed in the course of history, but it is rather the embodiment of a form of 
reflection and inquiry that not only values precedents and historical models, but even more important that values 
reflection on the past as a mode of a fundamentally philosophical and ethical endeavor. 
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xlii Good summaries of American New Humanism can be found in David J. Hoeveler Jr., The New Humanism, A Critique of Modern America,
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Literatur unter dem Einfluß der klassischen deutschen Ästhetik ˷Wang Guowei and Schopenhauer: a Philosophical Encounter. Changes in the 
Self-image of Chinese Literature under the Influence of German Classical Aesthetics˹ (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1986), and Tu, Ching-i, 
Conservatism in a constructive form: the case of Wang Kuo-wei (1877—1927), in Monumenta Serica (1969), pp.188-214. No Western studies on 
Tang Yongtong and Zhang Yinlin are available yet.  
lvi Chen and Tang were linked to Wu Mi and Mei Guangdi because they studied together at Qinghua University and at Harvard and were
introduced to Irving Babbitt by Mei Guangdi. 
lvii “Reconciling history with the nation?-Historicity, national particularity, and the question of universals”, in Historiography East and West 
vol.1 no. 1 (March 2003), pp.117-136. I prefer copying passages from the original text into this article rather than just referring to it, because, first, 
the article might not be available for everybody, and second, because not all passages from the original text are relevant for this article. 
lviii On the development of views of history and the problem of historicity in 19th and 20th century Europe see Bambach, Charles, Heidegger, 
Dilthey, and the crisis of historicism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1995. Barash, Jeffrey Andrew, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of 
Historical Meaning (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 1988. For a reappraisal of the history and impact of historicism see Jaeger, Friedrich, Rüsen, 
Jörn, Geschichte des Historismus. Eine Einführung ˷History of Historicism. An Introduction˹ (München: C.H. Beck), 1992, and Rüsen, Jörn, 
Konfigurationen des Historismus, Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur˷Configurations of Historicism. Studies on the German Culture of 
Science˹ (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp), 1993. 
lix The term “world views” aptly refers to the reflexivity of modern consciousness and hints at the cultural plurality and historical relativity 
which is so characteristic for modernity. On the modernity of “world views” see Heidegger, Martin, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes” ˷The Time of 
World View˹, in Heidegger, Martin, Holzwege (Frankfurt/ Main: Klostermann), 61980, pp.73-110. For a definition of the typical modern view 
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Historiography˹, in Li-shih yüeh-k’an 20 (1.1989), 10b, and Hsü Kuan-san, Hsin shih-hsüeh chiu-shih-nien, 1900—, 2 vols. ˷90 years of New 
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lxix On this very influential empiricist image of Ranke and the extent to which it partially misrepresents Ranke’s historiography see Iggers, 
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see FSNCC IV, 1337-1347. 
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“So wei ‘kuo-i’” ˷The so-called ‘National Medicine’˹, in Ta-kung pao ˷The Impartial˹ (August 5, 1934), see FSNCC VI, 2299-2304. 
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